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COMMENTS
CoRPORATIONs-PowER TO REACQUIRE OWN STOCK-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE THEREON-The Supreme Court of Rhode Island recently upheld1 the purchase by a corporation of its own stock in a transaction which impaired capital, despite the presence of an express statutory provision "that no corporation shall use its funds or property for the
1

Goldberg v. Peltier, (R.I. 1949) 66 A. (2d) 107.
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purchase of its own shares of capital stock when such use would cause
any impairment of the capital of the corporation."2 The court maintained that this statute applies only to an impairment of capital which
is detrimental to creditors; and that since the corporation in question
had no creditors, there was no violation. This contention was based
on the proposition that the statute merely adopted the common law rule
"that corporations ... may buy and sell their own shares provided they
do so in good faith without intending to injure, and without in fact
injuring, their creditors."3 Consequently, the court's holding squarely
asserts that the statutory limitation upon a corporation's power to acquire its stock is designed solely for the benefit of creditors. Is this true?
If so, is it good law?
The earliest American cases4 in this field held that a corporation
may purchase its own shares, although the reasons advanced for this
result varied. Finding no express prohibition against the practice in
the incorporation statutes or corporate charters, some courts jumped to
the conclusion that the power existed.6 Others were of the opinion
that the power was incidental and necessary to obtain the main objects
for which the corporation was formed. 6 Still others found the necessary
justification in the corporation's power to buy, hold, and sell personal
property. 7 Later the rule was modified to the extent that purchases
adversely affecting the rights of creditors were prohibited.8 In many
instances the limitation was of legislative design and took the form that
only purchases "out of surplus," 0 or "out of surplus profits,"10 or "not
impairing capital"11 were permissible. Undoubtedly these statutory
conditions were engendered by the "trust fund" theory1 2 -the principle
that capital may not be returned to shareholders so as to injure cred2rd. at 108.
3ld. at 109.
4 The first case on the question, Hartridge v. Rockwell, R. M. Charlt. 260 (Ga. 1828),
held that a corporation, here a bank, could invest its idle capital in its own stock regardless of
the rights of creditors.
5 Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37 (1873); Atlanta & Walworth Butter
& Cheese Assn. v. Smith, 141 Wis. 377, 123 N.W. 106 (1909).
6 New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894).
7 Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co., 18 Vt. 131 (1846).
BTownsend v. Maplewood Investment and Loan Co., 351 Mo. 738, 173 S.W. (2d)
911 (1943); Myers v. C. W. Toles & Co., 287 Mich. 340, 283 N.W. 603 (1939); McKay
v. Luzerne and Carbon County Motor Transit Co., 125 Pa. Super. 217, 189 A. 772 (1937).
o Fla. Stat. (1941) §612.08.
10 2 N.D. Rev. Code (1943) tit. 10-0323; Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 18, §58.
112 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 41, §24.
1 2 This theory was enunciated by Judge Story in Wood v. Dummer, (C.C. Me. 1824)
3 Mason 308; Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873). The phraseology used is
unrealistic but the end result of the theory is universally recognized as sound.
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itors. This doctrine is so deeply rooted in American jurisprudence that
its limiting effect upon corporate acquisition of treasury stock was felt
universally throughout the country. That this doctrine alone has circumscribed to any extent the power of a corporation to repossess its
own stock is somewhat startling to the writers of treatises13 and law
review articles.14 Nevertheless, such is the case, with the result that
the Rhode Island court must be held to have been on safe grounds in
its decision from the standpoint of the common law as it stands.
There are numerous objections to this holding, both in theory and
in practice. In the first place, if a corporation is allowed to buy back
some of its stock, it must likewise be permitted, as a matter of logic,
to reacquire the entire amount outstanding. But this is absurd. The
result would be to leave a surplus without an owner.15 Secondly, the
practice circumvents the precise statutory provisions found in many
states16 relating to the reduction of capital stock, provisions that must
be held to be all inclusive if they are to have vitality. The numerous
precautions set forth in these statutes are avoided if the corporation may
repurchase its own stock, since it is difficult to distinguish, for practical
purposes, stock that has been retired as a result of following the statutory method from reacquired stock. Even if the controlling interests of
the corporation intend to reissue the stock they have caused the corporation to buy in, this intention is open to objection because of the principle that corporations ought not to "traffic in their own shares."17
Corporations must perform useful functions. Speculation in their own
stock is not one of them.
Turning to practical business matters, another severe objection to
allowing a corporation to reacquire its own stock pertains to the resulting effect upon the remaining stockholders. This objection is particularly acute in the case of corporations whose stock is in the hands of
a small number of holders. 18 When one makes an investment in such
a company, he naturally assumes that his purchase will entitle him to
a certain percentage of the concem's voting power. He could not
13 l MoRAWETZ, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS,
MODERN 1.Aw OP CoRPORATIONS §626 (1908).

2d ed., §§ll2, 113 (1886); l

MACHEN,

14Glen, "Treasury Stock,'' 15 VA. L. REv. 625 (1929); Nussbaum, "Acquisition by a
Corporation of Its Own Stock," 35 CoL. L. REv. 971 (1935).
15 This problem of logic concerned Lord Watson in Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas.
409 (1887).
16 The Rhode Island court ignored its own state statute, R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. l 16,
§53, in reaching its decision in the case under consideration.
17 This principle is originally found in Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887).
18 This is so because in a small corporation management's control often rests on the narrowest majority of votes.
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reasonably have anticipated that its funds would be diverted from the
legitimate objective for which the enterprise was formed to that of
reacquiring stock in the hope of perpetuating the current management's ·
control. This, of course, is accomplished by buying a portion of the
minority stock outstanding, thus leaving the majority faction with an
even greater percentage of the votes. The condition of control under
which the investor originally agreed to participate is altered.
The investor has grounds for another complaint. He contributed
capital for carrying on the company's business, eyeing the capital already invested as a gauge of its prospects. When the corporation turns
around and spends its money on its own stock it may well have reduced
its capital below the point at which the stockholder was willing to participate. Although he stands the chance of receiving increased dividends since there are fewer holders, he also is faced with the possibility
of severer losses on his investment.
In the face of these objections19 it is not surprising that courts have
on occasion shown tendencies to limit further the power of corporations
to acquire treasury stock. Where the purchase of stock was the first
step in a deliberate plan to place shares in the hands of those in collusion with the current mruiagement of the company for the purpose of
perpetuating its control, the transaction has been cancelled by courts
of equity.2° Further, it has been recognized by a few courts that in
purchasing its own stock the corporation is effecting a reduction of
capital outside of the prescribed statutory method. 21 On this ground
these courts have rescinded the contract of sale. The New York Stock
Exchange now requires that corporations whose securities are listed
report purchases for their own account of treasury stock.22 The purpose
of this requirement is to reduce stock manipulation designed to stimulate artificially the stock's value.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island overlooked
an excellent opportunity to take another step in the desired directionan advance which could have been accomplished without fundamen19 An analysis of the benefits to be derived by a corporation from being permitted to buy
back its own stock is found in Levy, "Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock," 15 Mnm.
L. Rnv. 1 (1930). The author demonstrates convincingly that these benefits are largely
imaginative, or else can be accomplished by other means.
20 Elliott v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 69 (1907); Luther v. J. C. Luther Co., 118
Wis. 112, 94 N.W. 69 (1903).
21 Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73 (1884).
22 See C.C.H., Stock Exchange Regulation Service, p. 8825, §11615. The reasons are
set forth in a report by the Committee on Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange made
on Dec. 18, 1933 to the Governing Committee.
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tally violating the common law precedents on which it rested its decision. By obeying the words of the statute23 as they stood, that is, without implying a condition that creditors be injured, the court could have
forbidden the reacquisition. This construction of the statute is the
more natural and, at the same time, is in line with the better reasoning.
The presence of the word "any" in the statute adds reinforcement to
the advanced condition. Each word of a statute should be given meaning. Yet, the Rhode Island Court neglected "any," since it allowed a
purchase which did in fact deplete capital. How could the court have
done this if it had given the word in question its normal force? Without specifically deciding whether under any conditions a corporation
should have the power to repossess its own stock, there should be no
doubt that a purchase d~pleting capital is undesirable.

Fred W. Freeman, S.Ed.

23 The statute reads: "Every corporation shall have the power to acquire, hold, sell and
transfer shares of its own capital stock: Provided, that no corporation shall use its funds or
property for the purchase of its own shares of capital stock when such use would cause any
impairment of the capital of the corporation." R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. I 16 §5(g).

